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PROGRAM SPECIFICITY AND SECTION 504:
MAKING THE BEST OF A BAD SITUATION
Marc Charmatz*
and Sarah Geer**
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 is intended to be a
broad, remedial civil rights statute protecting disabled people from dis-
crimination in "any program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance."2 The statute prohibits discriminatory conduct based on handicap
in a variety of contexts: employment; elementary and secondary educa-
tion; post-secondary education; and health, welfare, and social services.
* Attorney for the National Association of the Deaf Legal Defense Fund, Washington,
D.C. B.A. 1969, New York University; J.D. 1972, Northwestern University.
** Attorney for the National Association of the Deaf Legal Defense Fund, Washington,
D.C. B.A. 1974, Oberlin College; J.D. 1977, University of North Carolina.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (as amended). The statute provides in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States... shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Exec-
utive agency or by the United States Post Service.
Id.
2. The "single overriding purpose" of Congress in enacting both § 504 and analogous
civil rights statutes was to insure that the funds of the United States were not used to support
discriminatory practices. United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1042-
43 (5th Cir. 1984) (Medicare and Medicaid payments constitute federal financial assistance
triggering the antidiscriminatory provisions of § 504), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 958 (1985); see
also Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding tuberculosis to be a
"handicap" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act), aff'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4245 (Mar. 3,
1987). But see Foss v. City of Chicago, where the court observed:
[N]either the Rehabilitation Act nor the Revenue Sharing Act are statutes which
have as a single goal bringing an end to discrimination like, for example, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. Rather, the antidiscrimination sections of these statutes, like
those of Title VI or Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, seek to strike a balance between
the federal policy against discrimination and the various policy goals which give rise
to federal funding.
640 F. Supp. 1088, 1909 (N.D. 111. 1986). For a review of the legislative history regarding
efforts to eliminate discrimination against handicapped persons, see Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985).
3. Federal agency regulations implementing § 504 include 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.1-.540 (1986)
(Department of Justice); 29 C.F.R §§ 32.1-31.51 (1986) (Department of Labor); 32 C.F.R.
§§ 56.1-56.10 (1986) (Department of Defense); 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.61 (1986) (Department
of Education); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.61 (1986) (Department of Health and Human Services);
49 C.F.R. §§ 27.1-27.67 (1986) (Department of Transportation). These regulations, following
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Section 504 is modeled after two statutes containing virtually identi-
cal language, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 (prohibiting dis-
crimination based on race) and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 19721 (prohibiting discrimination based on sex). Although the lan-
guage of these statutes appears to create a broad umbrella of civil rights
protection, barriers to section 504 compliance abound.
Victims of discrimination need to be aware of obstacles to enforce-
ment of section 504. Part of the problem of enforcing section 504 is that
the law has been in a state of flux, primarily because courts are divided
over definitions of the various terms in the statute. There is disagreement
as to which types of disabilities are protected by the statute,6 who is an
"otherwise qualified" handicapped person,7 what is a reasonable accom-
the model established by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, set out general
principles of nondiscrimination as well as specific sections dealing with architectural barriers,
educational programs, employment, and health, welfare and social services, as appropriate for
the types of financial assistance provided by federal departments.
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6
(1982)).
5. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 373 (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982)).
6. Congress defined "handicapped individual" in 1974 for purposes of § 504 and the
other provisions of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, as follows: A "handicapped individual"
is defined as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impair-
ment, or (iii) is regarded as having an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982); see 45
C.F.R. § 84.30)(1) (1986) and 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(a) (1986) for examples of regulations
adopting a similar definition.
In Arline, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that tuberculosis is a handicap. 772 F.2d at 764.
That decision, which may be a precursor to whether Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) is also a handicap, will be reviewed by the Supreme Court during the 1986-87 term.
See supra note 2. Several other courts have addressed the definition of "handicapped individ-
ual" in varying contexts. Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) (left-handedness is
not a physical or mental impairment under the Act); Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859 (8th
Cir. 1985) (varicose veins are not a handicap within meaning of Rehabilitation Act because
major life activities not impaired); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.
1985) (while cross-eyed condition may be a physical impairment, it does not substantially limit
the person's major life activities); Pridemore v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 625 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ohio
1985) (plaintiff's cerebral palsy was not so severe as to interfere with his functioning, and thus
he was not a handicapped person).
7. The term "otherwise qualified" is not defined in the Rehabilitation Act, but was the
subject of the first United States Supreme Court decision dealing with § 504. Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The Court stated that to be "otherwise
qualified" an applicant must meet all of the program's requirements in spite of the handicap.
In Davis, although the hearing impaired woman was a "handicapped person," she did not meet
the college's standards for admission and she was therefore not within the Act's protected class
of "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals."
Cases of interest in this area include: Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1981) (medical school applicant not qualified because of psychological problems); Pushkin v.
Regents of the Univ. of Clo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (proper analysis for the court is
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modation, what is the distinction between lawful reasonable accommoda-
tion and unlawful affirmative action,8 whether a private right of action is
available,9 what types of damages are available, 10 whether the statute
reaches only intentional discrimination," and what constitutes federal
financial assistance under the Act. 2
This Article addresses the most pernicious new obstacle recognized
by courts to proving a violation of section 504: what constitutes a "pro-
to first determine if a student with cerebral palsy should be considered handicapped, and sec-
ond, whether the student is otherwise qualified for the residency position at university hospital
and is being denied that position solely on the basis of that handicap); Norcross v. Sneed, 573
F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985) (blind applicant for libra-
rian job was "otherwise qualified," but was not discriminated against when more qualified
librarian was hired); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
vacated and remanded, 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983) (hearing impaired person "otherwise qual-
ified" to operate school bus).
8. The term "reasonable accommodation" does not appear in § 504, but it is referred to
in § 401 of the Rehabilitation Act, dealing with discrimination on the basis of handicap in
federal employment. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982). The § 504 regulations provide for reasonable
accommodations in employment. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.21 (1986). There is no doubt that § 504
requires federal recipients to make reasonable accommodations in their programs and activi-
ties. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732
F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985).
9. One of the first barriers raised to enforcement of § 504 was whether a private right of
action existed without having exhausted administrative remedies. Federal agencies that pro-
vide federal financial assistance have adopted regulations establishing administrative proce-
dures for termination of federal funds. In a series of decisions concerning the triad of civil
rights statutes (e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
Education Amendment of 1972), the Supreme Court struck down the requirement that com-
plainants exhaust these administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal court. The
Court ruled in favor of a private cause of action under § 504, Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); under Title VI, Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); under Title IX, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979). Administrative enforcement of civil rights claims is unwieldy, time-consuming and
ineffective. The ability to go directly into the judicial system is a significant victory for
plaintiffs.
10. In Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 469 U.S. 1032 (1985), the Court ruled that the
states had not waived their sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment in accepting
federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, and thus monetary damages were not available
against the states. See Sullivan v. University of Miss. Medical Center, 617 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.
Miss. 1985) (where agency of state charged with discrimination of the handicapped, eleventh
amendment bars suit for retroactive monetary damages).
11. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299 (assuming "without deciding that § 504 reaches at least
some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped").
12. "Federal financial assistance" is not defined in the statute, but the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare regulations define the term to mean:
[A]ny grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of in-
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gram or activity" receiving federal financial assistance. 13 No statute has
comprehensively defined these terms.14
Three recent Supreme Court cases, Grove City College v. Bell, 5 Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,"6 and United States Department of
Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 17 have defined "pro-
gram or activity" so as to restrict coverage under the civil rights acts to
surance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the Department provides
or otherwise makes available assistance in the form of:
(1) Funds;
(2) Services of Federal personnel; or
(3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property, in-
cluding:
(i) Transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market value or for
reduced consideration; and
(ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property if the Federal
share of its fair market value is not returned to the Federal Government.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1986). For an early discussion, see Cook v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp.,
502 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (receipt of funds under automobile rental contracts with
federal government does not constitute federal financial assistance).
13. The phrase "program or activity" occurs in other related statutes, but this Article is
limited to the antidiscrimination language in § 504. Numerous statutes have defined situations
where funding in whole or in part is deemed "programs or activities" receiving federal finan-
cial assistance. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 3151(a) (1982) (Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program or activity funded under
the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act); 20 U.S.C. § 1089 (1982) (prohibiting dis-
crimination against blind people in federally funded education programs and activities); Job
Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1577(a)(1) (1982) (providing that programs and activi-
ties otherwise financially assisted under the Act are considered to receive federal financial
assistance for purposes of applying § 504); 29 U.S.C. § 1577(a)(2) (1982) (prohibiting exclu-
sion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and denial of employment and other discrimi-
nation on the basis of handicap in programs receiving federal funds under the Job Training
Partnership Act); State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1976, 31 U.S.C. § 6716(b)(2) (1982)
(prohibits discrimination based on handicap in any program or activity funded under the Act);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-7 (1982) (prohibits discrimina-
tion based on handicap in programs or activities funded under preventive health and health
services block grants); 42 U.S.C. § 300y-9(a)(1) (1982) (primary care block grants); 42 U.S.C.
§ 708(a)(1) (1982) (maternal and child health care services block grants); 42 U.S.C. § 5309(a)
(1982) (community development programs); The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6011, 6063(b)(5)(C) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 9906(a)
(1982) (community services block grants); Domestic Volunteer Service Act Amendments of
1978, 42 U.S.C. § 5057(c)(1) (1982) (applies nondiscrimination provisions in Title V of the
Rehabilitation Act to applicants and volunteers under the Domestic Volunteer Service Act).
14. There is scant legislative history dealing with the definition of the word "activity."
The only congressional discussion of the term suggests that the words "program" and "activ-
ity" were synonymous. See 110 CONG. RIEc. 2487 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
15. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (mere fact that college enrolled students who received federal
financial aid, while the school itself received no federal funding, was not sufficient to extend
Rehabilitation Act coverage to entire institution).
16. 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (suit for employment discrimination may be maintained under
§ 504 Rehabilitation Act even if primary purpose of federal assistance received by employer
was not to promote employment).
17. 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986) (limiting nondiscriminatory language of Act to recipients, such
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an unprecedented extent. Prior to Grove City, courts and commentators
generally assumed that a broad interpretation of "program or activity"
was correct: all parts of an institution were subject to section 504 if any
one part received federal financial assistance for any purpose.18
Although not every component of a recipient might receive federal dol-
lars, it was assumed the institution as a whole benefitted from financial
assistance to any of its subparts. Commentators have characterized as-
pects of this analysis as the "taint" theory, the "infection" theory, the
"benefit" theory, and the "institution" approach.' 9 By contrast, in Grove
City, the Court adopted a narrow approach. It required identification of
the specific program that actually received federal dollars prior to impos-
ing any civil rights obligations on the institution.
This Article does not look back to the events leading up to these
three decisions, except for illustrative purposes, and does not attempt to
relitigate the issues. Other commentators have delivered harsh apprais-
als of the Grove City decision and its effects.2" We also do not engage in
analysis of the legislative proposals to cure the Grove City decision that
were introduced in Congress within days of the decision.2' It has now
as operators of airport who are in a position to accept or reject obligations as part of decision
to receive federal funds, and not imposing duty on users, such as commercial airlines).
18. Reliance on this approach can be found in Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370
F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967), where the school board refused to allow
black children of Air Force members to attend its schools. The court found that since the
school system accepted federal financial assistance for the maintenance and operation of its
schools, it "brought its school system within the class of programs subject to the Section 601
[of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] prohibition against discrimination." Id. at 852.
In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Court found that discriminatory impact was
sufficient to establish a claim under Title VI where the school district received federal financial
assistance. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.5(b) (1986).
19. See, e.g., Czapanskiy, Grove City College v. Bell: Touchdown or Touchback?, 43 MD.
L. REv. 379, 385-98 (1984); Note, Grove City College v. Bell And Program-Specificity: Nar-
rowing The Scope Of Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 34 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 1087, 1096-111 (1985);
Comment, The Discrimination Statutes And The Supreme Court's 'Program' For Confusion:
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone; Grove City College v. Bell; North Haven Board of Edu-
cation v. Bell, 17 CONN. L. REv. 629, 639-44 (1985).
20. See, eg., Czapanskiy, supra note 19, at 406-11; Comment, supra note 19, at 658-61;
Note, Grove City College v. Bell: A Proposal to Overturn the Supreme Court's Narrow Con-
struction of Title IX's Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 19 Loy. L.A.L. RnV. 235, 249-55 (1985).
21. In an effort to reverse the effects of Grove City, bills were quickly introduced in the
98th Congress to clarify congressional intent. See, eg., S. 2568, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),
entitled "The Civil Rights Act of 1984." This bill would have deleted the phrase "program or
activity" and substituted the term "recipient" as defined in the regulations implementing the
civil rights statutes. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1986). "The effect of this change is to prohibit
an entire institution or entity from discriminating if any of its parts receives federal funds."
130 CONG. REc. S4586 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984). The companion bill was H.R. 5490, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
Following introduction of the legislation, the Washington Post quoted President Reagan
1436 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1431
been more than two years since these proposals appeared, and they are
not yet near passage.2 2 We cannot afford to wait for these proposed
amendments to the civil rights statutes to become law.
Instead, this Article starts with the notion that at least for the fore-
seeable future, advocates will need to "live with it." While section 504
may be lessened in scope, it still remains a viable remedy for handicap
discrimination for a substantial number of victims. The practice of law
on behalf of disabled clients will require new energy and creativity to
work around the judicially imposed restraints, but the parameters of the
as saying that the legislation "is so broad that it actually would open the door to federal
intrusion in local and state governments and in any manner of ways beyond anything that has
ever been intended by the Civil Rights Act. That kind of legislation we would oppose." Con-
gress moves to counteract Supreme Court's ruling in Grove City College v. Bell, 8 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 323 (May-June, 1984).
The House passed H.R. 5490 overwhelmingly on June 26, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. H7017-
18 (daily ed. June 27, 1984). Its sponsors claimed that the broad coverage of the statutes
would be restored and that the entire institution would be liable for discriminatory behavior as
originally intended by Congress. However, the Senate shelved the House bill, and it was not
enacted into law. 130 CONG. REc. S12,642 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984). See generally Brejcha,
Grove City College v. Bell: Restricting the Remedial Reach of Title IX, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
319, 348-51 (1985); Garvey, The "Program or Activity" Rule in Antidiscrimination Law: A
Comment on S. 272, H.R. 700, and S. 431, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 445 (1986); Note, supra
note 20.
22. In 1985, more bills were introduced in the Senate relevant to this issue. Senate Bill
431, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985, did not delete "program or activity," but de-
fined it broadly to mean:
[A]ll of the operations of a department or agency of a State or of a local government;
or... the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance
and each such department or agency.., to which the assistance is extended... ; [or]
a university or a system of higher education; or... a local educational agency... ;
[or] ... a corporation, partnership, or other private organization; or... any other
entity determined in a manner consistent with [other programs].
S. 431, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1985), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. S1303 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1985).
Senate Bill 272 was similar to S. 431, but limited its effect to educational institutions. The
bill has been supported by the Reagan administration, but it has been strongly opposed by
members of Congress who claim that courts would narrowly interpret the civil rights statutes
in non-educational settings. According to this bill, the phrase "program or activity" as applied
to educational institutions would mean "the educational institution." S. 272, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. 8637 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
Hearings were held on S. 431 by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
Subcommittee on Education, on July 17, 1985. See Legislative and Regulatory Developments,
Update on Grove City College v. Bell legislation, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
376-77 (Sept.-Oct. 1985). On the House side, the House companion bill, H.R. 700, was or-
dered reported out of the Judiciary Committee on May 22, 1985, and was ordered reported out
of the Education and Labor Committee on May 21, 1985, with an amendment relating to the
funding of abortions. Id. This amendment provided that the bill did not "grant or secure or
deny any right" to abortion. Id. There has been no success in enacting this legislation since
these actions.
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three Supreme Court decisions can be reconciled to retain a good deal of
the civil rights protections contained in the three statutes.
II. OVERVIEW OF GROVE CITY, DARRONE AND PVA
A. The Statute and the Regulations
The three civil rights statutes, Title VI, Title IX, and section 504,
contain the same limitation: they only apply to "any23 program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance."'2 4 The statutes are alike in one
other respect: they adopt similar administrative enforcement mecha-
nisms.2" Federal funds may be cut off only to that part of an organiza-
tion, i.e., the program or activity, that actually receives federal funds.26
The statutes also contain significant differences. First, Title IX ap-
plies only to "education" programs. No such limitation is imposed by
23. The word "any" implies unlimited coverage, but no court has construed this term.
Instead, the courts have looked to the limitations of the phrase "program or activity."
24. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (Title IX); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (Q 504); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1982) (Title VI).
25. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982), 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l
(1982). The administrative enforcement mechanism is set out in the regulations to Title VI, 45
C.F.R. §§ 80.6-80.10, 81.1-81.131 (1986), 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6-100.10, 101.1-101.131 (1986).
The enforcement policies of the federal agencies have been a constant concern to civil rights
groups. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Twenty-
fourth Report, INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (Comm. Print 1985).
26. Title VI and Title IX utilize the following language to empower federal agencies with
regulatory authority: "Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity... is authorized and directed to effectu-
ate the provisions of [§ 2000d or § 1682] of this title with respect to such program or activity by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (empha-
sis added); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 which has essentially the same language but is limited to
any "education program or activity." Section 504 requires the promulgation of regulations but
does not use the phrase "program or activity" in setting forth that requirement. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1986). That requirement is implied through § 794a's incorporation by reference of Title
VI's enforcement scheme. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1986).
Title VI and Title IX use the phrase "program or activity" in specifying fund termination
procedures:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be affected
(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on
the record, . .. but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular
political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been
made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in
which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means provided by
law .... [In the case of fund termination], the head of the Federal department or
agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative juris-
diction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circum-
stances and the grounds for such action.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (emphasis added) (section 504 incorporates the reme-
dies set forth in Title VI, presumably including the above provision); 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
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Title VI or section 504. Second, section 504 narrows its scope to discrim-
ination based "solely" on the individual's handicap. Third, section 504
was expanded in 1978 to apply to federally conducted activities, e.g.,
"any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service." 27 Title VI and Title IX have not been simi-
larly extended.
Finally, the 1978 Amendments make section 504 available "to any
person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal
assistance ... ."'8 This is arguably the most important distinction be-
tween section 504 and the other statutes. By its terms, this language
applies the statute to the recipient itself, rather than to any program or
activity of that recipient. It thus appears to create an institution-wide
remedy. Since this phrase does not appear in Title IX, its meaning was
not discussed in Grove City College v. Bell.29 Curiously, neither does the
Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone3 nor in United States De-
partment of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America31 address
this point.
The section 504 regulations adopted by the United States Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)32 do not define "pro-
gram or activity."33  Instead, the regulations seem to adopt an
27. P.L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982)). See 124 CONG. REc. 3966 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Jeffords) (The 1978 amendment
"simply extends the coverage of Section 504 to include any department or agency of the federal
government.").
28. P.L. No. 95-602, § 120, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982) (em-
phasis added)).
29. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
30. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
31. 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986).
32. Following the decision in Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D.D.C. 1976),
HEW was designated the agency responsible for coordinating implementation of § 504 by all
federal departments. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976) (nondiscrimination
with respect to the handicapped in federally assisted programs). HEW's education programs
were transferred to the Department of Education in 1980 under the Education Reorganization
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (1982). The § 504 coordination function was transferred to the United
States Department of Justice by Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980).
33. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Educa-
tion regulations under Title VI both provide the following definition of "program":
The term "program" includes any program, project, or activity for the provision of
services, financial aid, or other benefits to individuals (including education or train-
ing, rehabilitation, housing, or other services, whether provided through employees
of the recipient of Federal financial assistance or provided by others through con-
tracts or other arrangements with the recipient, and including work opportunities
and cash or loan or other assistance to individuals), or for the provision of facilities
for furnishing services, financial aid or other benefits to individuals. The services,
financial aid, or other benefits provided under a program receiving Federal financial
assistance shall be deemed to include any services, financial aid, or other benefits
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institution-wide approach. The nondiscrimination prohibitions apply to
"recipients, 4 as well as to programs or activities.
However, the majority in Grove City overlooked similar language
applying the Title IX regulation to "recipients. '36 The Court's reading
of the Title IX regulations as program-specific was the basis for similar
holdings in Darrone and PVA.
provided with the aid of Federal financial assistance or with the aid of any non-
Federal funds, property or other resources required to be expended or made available
for the program to meet matching requirements or other conditions which must be
met in order to receive the Federal financial assistance, and to include any services,
financial aid, or other benefits provided in or through a facility provided with the aid
of Federal financial assistance or such non-Federal resources.
34 C.F.R. § 100.13(g) (1986) (Education); see also 45 C.F.R. § 80.13(g) (1986) (HHS), which
has essentially the same language but includes within its definition of program any program,
project or activity for the provision of services, etc., pertaining to health and welfare in addi-
tion to education, training, rehabilitation and housing.
The Title VI, Title IX and § 504 regulations issued by the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Department of Education do not define "program or activity"
although they implicitly use an institutional approach particularly in the assurance require-
ment. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.4, 104.5 & 106.4 (1986); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.4, 84.5 & 86.4 (1986).
Other agencies, however, have defined "education program or activity" in their Title IX regu-
lations. For example, according to the Department of Agriculture's regulation: "'Education
program or activity' " means: (1) Every program or activity operated by an educational recipi-
ent; and (2) Every program or activity operated by other recipients where a significant purpose
of the financial assistance is education. 7 C.F.R. § 15a.2(q) (1986).
34. "Recipient" is broadly defined as "any state or its political subdivision, any instrumen-
tality of a state or its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, organiza-
tion, or other entity ... to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through
another recipient." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1986).
35. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1) (1986) which provides that
[a] recipient, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not directly or through...
other arrangements, on the basis of handicap:
(i) Deny a qualified handicapped person the opportunity to participate in or
benefit from the aid, benefit, or service .. " See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4) (1986)
("A recipient may not... utilize criteria or methods of administration... that have
the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis
of handicap .... "). But see 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (1986), which applies to "discrimina-
tion in employment under any program or activity," and 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31, 84.41
(1986), which apply to education "programs and activities that receive or benefit
from federal financial assistance and to recipients that operate or that receive or ben-
efit from federal financial assistance for the operation of such programs or activities.
36. The Court stated that
[t]he regulations apply, by their terms, "to every recipient and to each education
program or activity operated by such recipient which receives or benefits from Federal
financial assistance." 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1982) (emphasis added). These regula-
tions... "conform with the limitations Congress enacted in §§ 901 and 902."
Grove City, 465 U.S. at 574 (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 539
(1982)) (emphasis in original).
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B. Prior Case Law
Prior to Grove City College v. Bell,3 7 the issue of the scope of section
504 centered on numerous Title IX38 and section 50439 cases dealing with
employment. This series of appellate court cases was reversed when the
Supreme Court ruled in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,40 and
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,41 that plaintiffs alleging sex and
handicap discrimination could maintain actions for employment discrim-
ination even if the aid received by the employer was not primarily in-
tended to promote employment. In both cases, since the lower courts
made determinations on grounds unrelated to the issue of "program or
activity," the cases had to be remanded.42
Lower courts were strongly divided on the correct interpretation of
37. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
38. Numerous Title IX decisions had found no private action for employment discrimina-
tion unless the plaintiff could demonstrate that the primary purpose of the federal aid was to
promote employment. See, e.g., Daughtery County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th
Cir. 1980); Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980); Romeo Community
Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Isleboro School
Community v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
39. Likewise, federal appeals courts found no private action for employment unless the
primary purpose of the aid was to promote employment. See, e.g., Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d
760 (5th Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1979);
Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
947 (1979). To be sure, there were hints of things to come. Thus, in Simpson v. Reynolds
Metal, the Seventh Circuit noted that § 504
does not, as plaintiff seems to contend, generally forbid discrimination against the
handicapped by recipients of federal assistance. Instead, its terms apparently require
that the discrimination must have some direct or indirect effect on the handicapped
persons in the program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. To be ac-
tionable, the discrimination must come in the operation of the program or manifest
itself in a handicapped individual's exclusion from the program or a diminution of
the benefits he would otherwise receive from the program.
629 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir. 1980). And in Brown, the Fifth Circuit noted that a handi-
capped individual had standing only if he could show that the program or activity with which
he was involved, or from which he was excluded, itself received or was directly benefitted by
federal financial assistance. "[Tihe receipt of federal financial assistance by a multiprogram
entity, for specific application to certain programs or activities does not, without more, bring
all of these multiple programs or activities within the reach of Section 504." Brown, 650 F.2d
at 767.
40. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
41. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
42. The dissent in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell suggested that a claim could be
dismissed on program specificity grounds if the employer could show "that the complaining
employees' salaries were not funded by federal money, that the employees did not work in an
education program that received federal assistance, or that the discrimination they allegedly
suffered did not affect a federally funded program." 456 U.S. 512, 540 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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the word "program."43 The most expansive judicial definition involved a
finding that the institution as a whole must comply with the antidis-
crimination statutes if any part of the institution received federal finan-
cial assistance.' This approach is most appropriate when an institution
receives general unrestricted or non-earmarked funds.4 5 In such a situa-
tion, the "program" which receives the federal aid is the institution
itself.46
Other courts analyzed the effect of federal financial aid to one part
of an institution, on the institution as a whole, or on other institutional
parts.4 7 Coverage under the civil rights statutes only occurred if the
other parts of the institution "benefitted" from the federal aid. For ex-
ample, in Bob Jones University v. Johnson,48 the court struck down ra-
cially discriminatory admissions policies. The court found that the entire
university received federal financial assistance because individual stu-
dents received federal veteran's benefits and student loans. Since stu-
dents participated in programs offered by the university, the entire
university was a "program" for purposes of Title VI enforcement.49
Another group of decisions concerned discriminatory programs af-
fecting activities which receive federal funding. These cases established
43. See generally Czapanskiy, supra note 19, at 384-98 and Comment, supra note 19, at
639-44 for a discussion of judicial theories.
44. This is also the approach that would be adopted by most of the bills introduced in
Congress to overturn the Grove City decision.
45. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d
Cir. 1982) (intercollegiate athletic program covered by Title IX although it did not receive
earmarked federal funds).
46. See Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 213 (D.N.H. 1981) (§ 504 requires that feder-
ally funded state program, viewed in its entirety, be available to all classes of handicapped
people, and noting the "intolerable burden" that would be imposed by requiring an attempt to
"identify precisely which federal funds flow to which activites and programs within [the
school]."); Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (federally funded
insitutions not permitted "to dissect themselves, at whim, into discrete entities, to allocate
federal dollars into programs which cannot discriminate against handicapped persons, and to
free privately obtained funds from those programs and instead to channel such money into
programs purportedly immune from § 504 strictures.").
47. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text and notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
48. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 602-03. Courts had held that a remedy may be sought where a discriminatory
program does not receive federal funds if the program is benefitted at least indirectly by federal
financial assistance. For example, in Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education, 490 F.
Supp. 948, 951 (D.N.J. 1980), the court held § 504 applicable because federal aid "to any
program in a school system releases local money for other uses, thereby benefitting those pro-
grams that are not direct beneficiaries of the federal aid." Accord Wright v. Columbia Univ.,
520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("[t]o the extent that the University receives federal
funding, component entities thereof benefit indirectly through the reallocation of funds re-
ceived from other sources.").
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the "infection" doctrine or the "tainted program" theory." Board of
Public Instruction v. Finch 1 illustrates the concept that a subunit of a
recipient is covered by the civil rights statutes if it is infected by a dis-
criminatory environment.52 In an administrative proceeding against a
local school board, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
found that the school district was not conducting desegregation of its
schools at an acceptable pace.53 As a result, the Department ordered
termination of all federal funds to the entire school district. The termi-
nation of funds affected the school system's adult education program
which had been receiving federal financial assistance.5 4 In response to
the school board's challenge to the administrative ruling, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that adult education, rather than the school as a whole, was the
"program" for purposes of Title VI, and remanded the case for an ad-
ministrative finding of which programs were either "administered in a
discriminatory manner, or . . . so affected by discriminatory practices
elsewhere in the school system that [they] thereby bec[ame]
discriminatory.
' 55
The "infection theory" is slightly more expansive. It extends civil
rights protections not only to the primary beneficiaries of federal aid, but
also to others who are in such a position that discrimination against them
necessarily affects direct program beneficiaries. The theory was used pri-
marily to extend Title IX coverage to school employees as well as to
students. For example, in Caufield v. Board ofEducation, 6 Title IX was
extended to female teachers, after the Second Circuit found that students
would be affected by gender discrimination against their teachers. 7
The most narrow interpretation of "program or activity" attempts
to pinpoint the part of the institution that receives the financial assist-
ance. This approach was seen in Hillsdale College v. Department of
Health, Education & Welfare,5 8 where the trial court determined that
because Hillsdale College received federal assistance through its student
50. See supra text accompanying note 19.
51. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. See Comment, supra note 19, at 641; see also infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
53. Finch, 414 F.2d at 1070.
54. Id. at 1070-71.
55. 414 F.2d at 1079.
56. 486 F. Supp. 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 632 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1030 (1981).
57. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 464
U.S. 67 (1983). This theory is no longer necessary since North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell extends Title IX coverage to teachers. 456 U.S. 512, 520 (1982).
58. 696 F.2d 418, 428-29 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 466 U.S. 901, on remand, 737 F.2d 520
(6th Cir. 1984).
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financial aid program, the entire college had to operate in compliance
with Title IX. The court of appeals overturned the finding that the entire
entity had to operate in compliance with Title IX, because this approach
would "contravene the program-specific nature of Title IX."' The ap-
peals court was concerned that the structure of Title IX would be mean-
ingless if every program at the college had to comply with Title IX.
60
C. The Grove City Decision
Grove City College is a small, private coeducational school that re-
ceives federal funds in the form of Pell Grants, formerly known as Basic
Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs),61 granted to eligible stu-
dents.62 Because Grove City College decided to limit its involvement
with federal regulation and oversight, it declined any other form of fed-
eral assistance. The college chose instead to use the Department of Edu-
cation's Alternate Disbursement System for receipt of BEOG funds.
Under this system, the college does not receive a check from the federal
government for eligible students, or even engage in screening students'
eligibility to receive federal funds. The college's only contact with the
funding system is in accepting the funds from the individual students
who receive BEOG checks.
59. Id. at 424; see also University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982),
where the Department of Education was enjoined from investigating allegations of discrimina-
tion against women in the athletics department, because that department had not received any
"direct" financial assistance. Accord Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981). The
Brown court held that it was insufficient "simply to show that some aspect of the relevant
overall entity or enterprise receives ... some form of input from the federal fisc. A private
plaintiff.., must show that the program or activity with which he or she was involved...
itself received or was directly benefitted by Federal financial assistance." Brown, 650 F.2d at
769; see also Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336 (lst Cir. 1981),
cerL denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982).
60. Hillsdale College, 696 F.2d at 428. The appellate court reasoned that under the trial
court's interpretation, "every program or activity of an educational insititution that accepts
students who receive federal assistance would be subject to regulation under Title IX." Id.
Consequently, the effect of any university discrimination in any non-federally funded program
"would be to terminate all student federal financial assistance." Id. (emphasis in original).
The court concluded that Hillsdale College was not subject to Title IX because the Act did not
compel this result. Id. Thus, it did not have to comply with Title IX or the regulations of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a) (1982) (authorization of grants for college tuition of financially
needy students).
62. Although some of the college's students receive Guaranteed Student Loans (GSLs),
the Department of Education did not appeal from the portion of the district court's decision
holding that GSLs are federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX. Instead, the
Department of Education appealed the decision that GSLs are not subject to Title IX because
they are expressly exempt as contracts of insurance or guaranty. Grove City College v. Bell,
687 F.2d 684, 690 n.10 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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When Grove City College refused to sign a Title IX Assurance of
Compliance, the Department of Education initiated enforcement pro-
ceedings against the school. After an administrative law judge ruled that
the college did receive federal financial assistance, and that the BEOGs
must be terminated, the college sought declaratory relief.
6 3
The Supreme Court stated that the major issue in Grove City was
identifying the "education program or activity" of the college that can
properly be characterized as "receiving" federal assistance through
grants to some of the students attending the college. 4 The grant money
was held to be federal financial assistance to the college,65 even though it
was issued in the names of students under the Alternative Distribution
System.6 The majority took the narrow view that the "program" receiv-
ing federal assistance was the financial aid office, not the institution as a
whole. First, the fact that federal financial assistance added to college
resources did not determine the "program," even though the funds be-
came a part of the college's general budget. Second, the fact that federal
funds received in one program might free up the college's general re-
sources did not make the entire college a recipient. There was no evi-
dence of reallocation of resources. "Most federal education assistance
has economic ripple effects throughout the aided institution, and it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which programs or activities
derive such indirect benefits." 67 In other words, simply because one de-
63. The district court agreed with the Department of Education that Basic Educational
Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) constituted federal financial assistance, but the court reversed
the administrative decision, holding that proof of gender discrimination under Title IX was a
prerequisite to termination of the grant program. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp.
253, 270-73 (W.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), affid, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that indirect as well as direct aid
triggers compliance with Title IX, and that such aid makes the institution itself the program.
The college's failure to issue an Assurance of Compliance justified termination of federal aid to
the school. Grove City, 687 F.2d at 705.
64. 465 U.S. 555, 558-59 (1984).
65. All the justices agreed that Title IX coverage was not foreclosed because federal funds
are granted to Grove City students rather than directly to one of the educational programs.
Id. at 569-70. They also generally agreed that due to the college's refusal to execute an Assur-
ance of Compliance, the United States Department of Education was justified in terminating
federal assistance to the student financial aid program. Id. at 575. The attachment of condi-
tions to the receipt of federal aid did not violate first amendment rights. Id.
66. The Court stated that:
Nothing in [the statute] suggests that Congress elevated form over substance by mak-
ing the application of the nondiscrimination principle dependent on the manner in
which a program or activity receives federal assistance. There is no basis in the stat-
ute for the view that only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive
checks directly from the federal government are subject to regulations.
Id. at 564.
67. Id. at 572. The Supreme Court observed that "[u]nder the Court of Appeals' theory,
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partment received earmarked grants did not make the entire college sub-
ject to Title IX. 8 Third, the student financial assistance program was sui
generis, one of a kind. 9 The Third Circuit had compared BEOG funds
to non-earmarked aid, since funds were deposited in the school's general
operating budget for use in a variety of programs.7" But the Supreme
Court found that BEOG funds were in effect earmarked 7 for the student
financial aid program.72 Finally, the Court noted that unlike other
funds, financial aid "increases both an institution's resources and its
obligations."73
As a result of the nature of the funds and the program-specific na-
ture of Title IX,7 4 the only part of the school that could be regulated was
the financial aid department.75 "[W]e have found no persuasive evidence
an entire school would be subject to Title IX merely because one of its students received a
small BEOG or because one of its departments received an earmarked federal grant. This
cannot be squared with Congress' intent." Id.
68. The Court did not rule on the effect that earmarked funds received by one department
might have on another department as compared to the entire school.
69. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573.
70. Grove City, 687 F.2d at 700.
71. Because the Court drew an express distinction between earmarked aid and non-
earmarked aid, the decision is applicable only where the recipient's federal funds are
earmarked.
72. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573-74. The Court held that
"[i]n neither purpose nor effect can BEOGs be fairly characterized as unrestricted
grants that institutions may use for whatever purpose they desire. The BEOG pro-
gram was designed, not merely to increase the total resources available to educational
institutions, but to enable them to offer their services to students who had previously
been unable to afford higher education."
Id. at 573.
73. Id.
74. Although the statute reached only the financial aid office, it applied to all activities of
that program. The Supreme Court observed:
There is no merit to Grove City's argument that the Department may regulate only
the administration of the BEOG program. Just as employees who "work in an edu-
cation program that receive[s] federal assistance,"... are protected under Title IX
even if their salaries are "not funded by federal money," ... so also are students who
participate in the College's federally assisted financial aid program but who do not
themselves receive federal funds protected against discrimination on the basis of sex.
Grove City, 465 U.S. at 571 n.21 (citations omitted).
75. Two dissenting justices concluded that the entire college institution, not just the finan-
cial aid office, should be considered a recipient of federal funds. Id. at 599 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). The dissent argued that the majority had disregarded
the broad remedial purposes of Title IX that consistently have controlled our prior
interpretations of this civil rights statute. Moreover, a careful examination of the
statute's legislative history, the accepted meaning of similar statutory language in
Title VI, and the postenactment history of Title IX will demonstrate that the Court's
narrow definition of "program or activity" is directly contrary to congressional
intent.
Id. at 583 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, noted that the majority opinion was "speculation
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suggesting that Congress intended that the Department's regulatory au-
thority follow federally aided students from classroom to classroom,
building to building, or activity to activity."76
D. Consolidated Rail v. Darrone
The original plaintiff in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone77 filed
suit against Consolidated Rail (Conrail), alleging that Conrail discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of handicap in violation of section 504.
Plaintiff had been terminated from his duties as a locomotive engineer
after amputation of his left arm. The issue that reached the Supreme
Court was the requirements for bringing a private action under section
504.
The Court's primary holding in Darrone was that a handicapped
person could maintain a private cause of action under section 504 even if
the federal aid received by his employer was not for the primary purpose
of promoting employment.78 The Court also considered which of the
defendant's programs were subject to section 504. The decision resulted
in a remand of the case to the district court to consider whether in light
of Grove City College v. Bell, '9 the handicapped person "had sought and
been denied employment in a 'program... receiving Federal financial
assistance.' " The district court had not "develop[ed] [a] record or
[made] the factual findings that would be required to define the relevant
'program.' 9981
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Grove City did not provide
"particular guidance as to the appropriate treatment of the programs."82
In particular, the Court noted that Grove City dealt with grants of finan-
rather than evidence" because no detailed factual record had ever been made that would allow
a determination of which programs at the college substantially benefitted from the monies. Id.
at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring). He also noted that the Court had overlooked "the fact that
the regulation is in the disjunctive; Title IX coverage does not always depend on the actual
receipt of federal financial assistance by a given program or activity." Id. at 580 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). According to Justice Stevens, the regulations apply "'to every recipient which
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance."' Id. at 580-81 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1982)).
76. Id. at 573.
77. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
78. Id. at 637.
79. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
80. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 636.
81. Id. In a footnote, the Court observed that "Conrail [did] not contest that it receive[d]
federal financial assistance within the meaning of § 504. Apparently, the Government's pay-
ments to Conrail exceed the fair market value of the securities issued by Conrail to the Gov-
ernment." Id. at 636 n.19.
82. Id. at 636.
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cial aid to students, i.e., earmarked grants, and not with the kind of gen-
eral funding received by Conrail.83 Nevertheless, the Court noted that
section 504, like Title IX, does not reach all discrimination everywhere,
but applies only to federal grant recipients.14 Furthermore, the ban on
discrimination does not necessarily apply to all activities of every recipi-
ent of federal funds; rather, the ban is program specific, i.e., the discrimi-
nation must relate to the federally funded program or activity. 5
E. United States Department of Transportation v.
Paralyzed Veterans of America
A divided Supreme Court in United States Department of Transpor-
tation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America 6 determined that section 504
may be applied only to those few airline companies that are direct recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance under the Federal Aviation Act.87 The
fact that air carriers benefit from the federal financial assistance received
by airports8 and the federally controlled air traffic control system was
not sufficient to bring them under section 504.89 According to the Court,
83. Id.
84. Id. at 624-26. One commentator noted that the effect of Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone was to allow a handicapped person to go to federal court to redress an employment
discrimination complaint, while making it more diflficult to locate an appropriate party to sue.
"The justices made sure that the potential liability for discrimination infractions was narrowly
circumscribed around the specific entities utilizing those funds." Parry, Summary, Analysis,
Commentary, 9 MENTAL & PHYsICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 3 (Jan.-Feb., 1985).
85. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 636.
86. 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986). Precursors to PVA were Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,
743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984) (airline did not receive federal financial assistance pursuant to
government mail contracts); Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, 519 F. Supp. 1173 (D.D.C.
1981) (airline not considered direct recipient of federal funds merely because airport received
funds); Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (payments under con-
tract to carry mail are not federal assistance), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 2129 (1985); see also
Disabled in Action v. Mayor of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1982) (baseball club tenant
of stadium partially renovated with federal funds, not recipient of federal funding under
§ 504).
87. PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2712. The holding in PVA should have come as no surprise. The
Civil Aeronautics Board had previously decided not to regulate the on-board activities of com-
mercial airlines under Title VI.
None of the agencies concerned with aviation attempted to regulate the on-board
activities of commercial airlines under Title VI. Thus, the consistent administrative
interpretation of the program-specific language of Title VI and Section 504 has been
that it does not cover commercial airlines, unless the airline itself receives subsidies
from [the] CAB.
Id. at 2709 n.6.
88. See the Airport Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1714, repealed by Airport and
Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2225 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
89. PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2712. The Court did not reach the issue of the responsibilities of
airports, which are recipients, to prevent discrimination against disabled passengers. Plaintiffs
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it was "not difficult to identify the recipient of federal financial assistance
.... Congress has made it explicitly clear that these funds are to go to
airport operators. Not a single penny of the money is given to the
airlines." 90
The Court rejected the argument that the airlines were indirect re-
cipients of funds given to the airports. 91 One key factor identified by the
Court was the airlines' lack of involvement in the decision whether to
accept or reject federal assistance.92 Since the airlines had no decision-
making authority over those funds, the airlines were beyond the scope of
section 504.
The fact that the airlines were "inextricably intertwined" 93 with the
airports was not persuasive. Such reasoning would extend section 504
beyond its bounds by including industries that depend on the federal
highway system or on the federally-supported port system. "The Court
of Appeals' attempt to fuse airports and airlines into a single program or
activity is unavailing. It is by reference to the grant statute, and not to
might consider actions against airport operators, alleging discrimination when they contract
with or extend benefits to discriminating airline companies. See Disabled in Action, 685 F.2d
881 (anti-discrimination policy of the Rehabilitation Act can be fully vindicated by holding the
city accountable, without stretching the Act to encompass the city's tenants). See 45 C.FR.
§ 84.4(b)(1)(v) (1986) and 49 C.F.R. § 27.7(b)(1)(v) (1986), stating that a recipient of federal
financial assistance cannot provide financial or other assistance "to an agency, organization or
person that discriminates on the basis of handicap in providing any aid, benefit or service to
beneficiaries of the recipient's programs." See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(6) (1986) and 49 C.F.R.
§ 27.7(b)(6) (1986), that forbids discrimination with regard to a service "provided in or
through a facility that has been constructed, expanded, altered, leased or rented, or otherwise
acquired, in whole or in part, with Federal financial assistance."
90. PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2711.
91. The PVA court cited statements in Grove City College v. Bell to the effect that no dis-
tinctions between direct and indirect aid were made
in the context of determining whom Congress intended to receive the federal
money .... It was clear in Grove City that Congress' intended recipient was the
College, not the individual students to whom the checks were sent from the Govern-
ment. It was this unusual disbursement pattern.., that caused us to recognize that
federal financial assistance could be received indirectly. While Grove City stands for
the proposition that Title IX coverage extends to Congress' intended recipient,
whether receiving the aid directly or indirectly, it does not stand for the proposition
that federal coverage follows the aid past the recipient to those who merely benefit
from the aid. In this case, it is clear that the airlines do not actually receive the aid;
they only benefit from the airport[']s use of the aid.
Id. at 2712.
92. Id. at 2711. The Court stated that:
By limiting coverage to recipients, Congress imposes the obligations of § 504 upon
those who are in a position to accept or reject those obligations as a part of the
decision whether or not to "receive" federal funds. In this case, the only parties in
that position are the airport operators.
Id.
93. Id. at 2713.
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hypothetical collective concepts like commercial aviation or interstate
highway transportation, that the relevant program or activity is
determined."
9 4
The Court noted that the federally-operated air traffic control sys-
tem is not a form of federal assistance to the airlines. "In short, the air
traffic control system is 'owned and operated' by the United States....
[I]t is a federally conducted program that has many beneficiaries but no
recipients.""5
Grove City, Darrone, and PVA create a plethora of new issues, but
resolve few of them.96
III. THE AFTERMATH
A. Administrative Enforcement
Following the decision in Grove City College v. Bell,97 the United
States Department of Education took a new and much more restrictive
94. Id. at 2714. Three dissenting justices found that the appropriate question was not
whether commercial airlines receive federal financial assistance, but rather "whether commer-
cial airlines are in a position to 'exclud[e handicapped persons] from the participation in ....
den[y them] the benefits of, or... subjec[t them] to discrimination under' a program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance .... Id. at 2716 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
and Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to the dissent:
If commercial airline companies barred the handicapped from traveling on their air-
lines at all, then that conduct would deny the handicapped the benefits of federally
funded and conducted programs and activities relating to the airport and airway
system.
... [C]ommercial airlines are in a unique position to deny public access to feder-
ally funded airport and airway services .... [A] critical and obvious benefit of the
airport and airway system, for members of the general public, is that it allows them
to purchase tickets on airlines and to travel from city to city.... Commercial airlines
thus necessarily act as gatekeepers [of this system].
Id. at 2716-17 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Foss v.
City of Chicago, 640 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (1986). A fire department's decisions about who to
hire and fire controlled who would enjoy the benefits of programs where the individual firemen
were the intended recipients and the fire department the beneficiary. "The federal agency
could demand wheelchair ramps at airports because the airports were a federally funded pro-
gram or activity. It could not demand appropriate facilities for the handicapped in airplanes,
... because the airlines were not recipients of federal funds. If the Rehabilitation Act does not
reach airlines in those circumstances, we do not think it can reach the Fire Department here."
Foss, 640 F. Supp. at 1095.
95. PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2715. Since 1978, federally conducted programs have been explic-
itly covered by § 504. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (as amended). Airline passengers might con-
sider an action against the air traffic control system itself, on the grounds that it may not
contract with or extend its benefits to air line carriers that discriminate on the basis of handi-
cap. See model Department of Justice regulations for federally-conducted programs, 28
C.F.R. §§ 39.101-39.149 (1986).
96. See the discussion, infra, in Parts III, IV and V of this Article.
97. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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approach to enforcement of the nondiscrimination statutes. The analysis
was announced by the Department of Education's Civil Rights Review-
ing Authority in the case of In Re Pickens County School District." The
Department questioned whether it had jurisdiction to investigate allega-
tions of discrimination under Title IX in the physical education program
operated by Pickens County. Although the school district received fed-
eral aid from at least four different programs during the relevant time
period,9 9 the administrative law judge's examination of whether any of
this assistance was "received" by the physical education classes was in-
consistent with the Grove City decision."
The Department of Education's Civil Rights Reviewing Authority
first found that institution wide jurisdiction is not appropriate if more
narrowly focused programs can be ascertained."' For example, Pickens
County receives federal funds under Chapter 2 of the Education Consoli-
dation and Improvement Act of 198 1.102 This block grant program con-
solidates a number of previously authorized programs into one grant.
Although the combination of programs could potentially benefit virtually
any activity of a school system, 10 3 the Department of Education declared
98. In re Pickens County School Dist. & South Carolina Dep't of Educ., No. 84-IX- 11
(1985) (Rulings on Exceptions and Final Decision of the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority of
the United States Department of Education) [hereinafter Pickens County].
99. Federal funding statutes under which the school district received financial assistance
from the Department of Education were the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act
of 1981, ch. 1 & 2, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 469 (1981) (current versions at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 3811-3863 (1982)); Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
142, 89 Stat. 774 (1975) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982)); Adult Education
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 159 (1970) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213
(1982)); Vocational Education Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 94-482, tit. II, § 202(a), 90 Stat. 2169
(1976), repealed by Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-524, 98 Stat.
2435 (1984) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2461 (Supp. III 1985)).
100. The Administrative Law Judge found that none of the statutes under which the school
district received assistance contained programs related to physical education, and therefore the
physical education program of the school district did not receive federal financial assistance.
Pickens County, supra note 98, at 5 (citing Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge,
No. 84-IX-1 1, Jan. 17, 1985, at 8). The Administrative Law Judge had equated the "program
... receiving federal financial assistance" with the program designated in the funding statute
under which the school district received money. Pickens County, supra note 98, at 10.
101. Id. at 14.
102. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3863 (1982).
103. In a memorandum to all Regional Civil Rights Directors, the Office for Civil Rights
stated:
Chapter 2 payments may be used by [a Local Education Agency] at its complete
discretion to provide financial aid to any and all elementary and secondary education
programs, and to activities to manage or administer the school system. The range of
programs for which Chapter 2 funds may be used reaches throughout the school
district's programs .... Therefore there is a presumption that all of an LEA's pro-
grams and activities are subject to OCR's jurisdiction.
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that it is necessary to determine the specific purpose for which grant
money is given and used before identifying which activities of the school
district come within the ambit of the nondiscrimination statutes.'1
4
To determine which "program" of a recipient receives federal finan-
cial assistance, the Department of Education will look first at the funding
statute to determine if the grant is earmarked or nonearmarked.' °5 If the
grant is earmarked, then the department must ascertain the intended use
of the earmarked funds, by reference to "identifiable programs or
projects created by Congress."'10 6 The next step is to identify the specific
"program or activity" receiving federal assistance by analyzing the insti-
tution's functions and administrative or organizational structure. The
Department of Education views "program or activity" as the "functional
activity of the institution which promotes the achievement of the
earmarked purpose designated in the funding statute."'1 7 It may or may
not be a defined organizational unit of the institution. 08
B. Judicial Interpretations
The major precept drawn from the three recent Supreme Court deci-
sions is that the issue of program specificity must be decided case by case,
based upon an analysis of the underlying facts surrounding the federal
Memorandum from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to Regional
Civil Rights Directors (July 31, 1984) (providing an analysis of the Grove City College v. Bell
decision and guidance on its application to enforcement activities of the OCR) (copy on file at
National Ass'n of the Deaf Legal Defense Fund, Washington, D.C.).
104. Pickens County, supra note 98, at 15-16. Although the school district has wide latitude
in how it chooses to use Consolidation Act funds, it must submit an application designating
intended uses. Funds must then be used only for those designated purposes. According to the
Department of Education, such designated block grant funds become synonymous with
"earmarked" federal funds, despite the apparently unlimited scope of the block grant program.
Contrast the Department of Education analysis of block grants with the earlier Department of
Education memorandum, supra note 103, and with the holding in O'Connor v. Peru State
College, 781 F.2d 632, 639 (8th Cir. 1986).
105. Nonearmarked grants are not addressed by the Pickens County decision. Pickens
County, supra note 98, at 17 n.22.
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id. at 18.
108. The Department of Education gives two illustrations of this point. In a grant received
under the Consolidation Act for preparing students to use metric weights and measures, the
funds received might be used in a school's science program, or its mathematics program.
Either "program" could constitute a functional activity closely related to the teaching of met-
rics (which is the earmarked purpose of the statutory program). In this example, the program
or activity would not necessarily constitute a defined organizational unit. Teachers involved in
such a program may teach other subjects as well, and classrooms might be used for other
activities. By contrast, a grant for "comprehensive guidance, counseling and testing pro-
grams" would usually be received by a career and counseling department, a clearly defined
organizational unit. Id. at 19-20.
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spending. "9 "The primary focus should be on the purposes meant to be
served by the particular federal funds received by the institution."I 0  As
long as some federal funding is alleged, the program specificity issue is
not properly the subject of a motion to dismiss prior to full discovery. 1I
At the pleading stage, plaintiffs will seldom if ever know the intricacies of
a recipient's federal assistance. 
12
While lower courts have dismissed Title IX113 and Section 504114
cases on program specificity grounds, reviewing courts 15 have not pro-
109. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 636 (1984) (district court did
not "develop the record or make the factual findings that would be required to define the
relevant 'program' "); see also United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 151 (2d Cir.
1984), aff'd sub nom. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986) ("[T]he issue of
program specificity cannot be properly analyzed in the abstract, but instead requires a concrete
set of facts.").
110. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 599 (1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. It may not be resolved even on a motion for summary judgment. See Tudyman v.
United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 151.
112. Byers v. Rockford Mass Transit Dist., 635 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also
Kamen v. AT&T, 791 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2d Cir. 1986) (whether a defendant was receiving
federal financial assistance "could hardly be known to an outsider, and.., the relevant infor-
mation was largely in the control of the defendants"); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579
F. Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiffs entitled to obtain as complete a record as possible
before being required to respond to the argument that they have demonstrated an insufficient
nexus between the funding received by the defendant and the positions for which they were
rejected).
113. Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986); Lantz v. Ambach,
620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Zangrillo v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 601 F. Supp.
1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
114. See, eg., Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1986) (state bar
association did not directly receive or benefit from any federal financial assistance; fact that
two bar related activities, a research entity and prepaid legal services, received federal funding
during the period of plaintiff's employment did not constitute receipt of federal funds).
In Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 628 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the employer's
training department contracted with the federal government through the Comprehensive Em-
ployment Training Act (CETA) and Work Incentive Program (WIN). The plaintiff argued
that the funds benefitted all units or programs which subsequently employed any of the train-
ees. Id. at 144.
The court found that these funds were not federal financial assistance to the entire opera-
tion of the employer. Since only the subsidized training division received federal assistance,
the plaintiff could not bring a § 504 claim. "Plaintiffs made no showing that the CETA or
WIN funds distributed to [the employer training department] were intended by Congress to
have effects as far-reaching on all of Con Ed's operations as do the Medicare ... statutes
specified for hospitals. .. ." Id. at 145. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that tax
credits received by the employer for capital expenditures on tangible property were federal
assistance to all programs within the organization. Id. at 146.
115. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). In Bowen, the
Court found "no reason to review the Court of Appeals' assumption that the provision of
health care to infants in hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments is a part of a
'program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'" Id. at 2111 n.9. In another foot-
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vided much guidance on the extent of the nexus required between the
"program or activity" receiving federal financial assistance and the plain-
tiff's involvement in that program.' 6 Moreover, it is often difficult to
define which program or activity is receiving federal financial assist-
ance.' 17 In other words, the law on program or activity is still "quite
unsettled.""1 '
IV. RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
The remainder of this Article considers some of the creative ap-
proaches available to plaintiffs to meet their burden of proving that a
program or activity receives federal financial assistance. Although some
of this analysis has been adopted by lower courts, these cases are in-
cluded for illustrative purposes only. The decisions are sometimes re-
versed on appeal, or not appealed at all. As in the "primary purpose"
section 504 employment case, this turbulent area of law will require deci-
sions in a variety of circuits before a definitive analysis of the issues is
available.
The inquiry is divided into two parts. "At the outset,... Section
504 requires us to identify the recipient of federal assistance.""' 9 Defend-
note, the Court noted that interpretive guidelines appended to the final Baby Doe rules pro-
hibit health care providers from discriminating against handicapped infants in reporting
instances of parental neglect. "We do not address the question whether reporting, either as a
hospital practice or as a requirement of state law, consititutes a 'program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance' under § 504." Id. at 2119 n.25.
Justice White, in dissent, noted that the program or activity question was a "fact-specific
inquiry." Id. at 2125 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). Although the courts below had assumed that
the entire hospital was covered by § 504, Justice White considered under what circumstances a
hospital neonatal program may be a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
In the absence of factual development or analysis, he declined to conclude that § 504 would
never apply to such programs. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
Some courts, while requiring program specificity, have left open the identification of the
relevant "program." See, eg., Meyerson v. Arizona, 709 F.2d 1235, 1237 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)
(not reaching the issue of the nexus required between the program receiving federal money and
the plaintiff's injury in being excluded from a benefit).
116. O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 640 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The application
of the program specific requirement in broader contexts since Grove City has apparently not
been considered in this circuit, and most appellate and district courts which have found it
necessary to reach the issue have ruled more by edict than analysis."); see also Tudyman, 608
F. Supp. at 742.
117. See Foss v. City of Chicago, 640 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Case law on
the subject of what constitutes a federally assisted program or activity.., does not establish
bright line rules on how such characterizations are made.").
118. Kamen, 791 F.2d at 1014; see also Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 742
(C.D. Cal. 1984) ("Defining the appropriate program or activity is not an easy task.").
119. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 106 S. Ct. 2705, 2711
(1986).
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ants in civil rights cases have often claimed that they do not receive fed-
eral funds, i.e., that they are not "recipients." Of course, if this is so,
plaintiffs have no recourse against them under Title VI, Title IX or sec-
tion 504. Second, if federal funding in any form is established, it is neces-
sary to define "any program or activity" of the recipient that receives the
funds.
A. General Discussion
Grove City College received federal financial assistance "indirectly,"
in the form of grants to students rather than grants to the College. Con-
solidated Rail Corporation received federal financial assistance in the
form of purchase of stock by the government at more than fair market
value, as well as funds for retraining programs and employee termination
programs. Grove City College v. Bell 20 is seen as providing an "expan-
sive reading" of when an entity has received federal financial assist-
ance.121 This view is not altered in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone 22
or United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of
America. 1
2 3
"Recipient" and "federal financial assistance" have been broadly de-
fined in the federal regulations, 24 and broadly interpreted by the
courts.12 5 Virtually any extension of value from the federal government
is seen as "federal financial assistance."
There are a few exceptions to this rule. The grant of a television
broadcast license is not federal financial assistance to a broadcaster.
12 6
120. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
121. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 743 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
122. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
123. 106 S. Ct. 2705 0986).
124. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(f), 84.3(h) (1986). Federal financial assistance is defined as
any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of insur-
ance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the Department provides or
otherwise makes available assistance in the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of federal
personnel; or (3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such prop-
erty, including: (i) Transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market
value or for reduced consideration; and (ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or
lease of such property if the Federal share of its fair market value is not returned to
the Federal Government.
Id.
125. See, eg., PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2712 n.l1, where the Court noted that "financial" assist-
ance can take "nonmoney form" such as property improvements. "The Supreme Court has
rejected attempts to read limitations into the term [federal financial assistance] which are not
apparent on the face of Section 504." Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 763 (1985) (citing
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632 (1984)), aff'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4245 (Mar.
3, 1987); see also Grove City, 465 U.S. at 563.
126. Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
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The use of the federal air traffic control system is not federal financial
assistance to airlines. 127 In one recent case, a federal district court found
that an individual, rather than his employer, was the recipient of federal
programs. 128
For purposes of section 504, the recipient "is the entity that receives
the money" 129 or other items of value under the grant statute. A recipi-
ent should not be confused with beneficiaries or users of the programs
that the recipient operates. The airlines in PVA were not recipients of
federal funds. Instead, they were found to be merely users of airport
facilities. Although the airlines benefitted from the improved airport fa-
cilities, they did not actually "receive" the funds or the improvements,
and thus were not subject to section 504.130
B. Types of Federal Financial Assistance
The judicial guidelines issued to date on receipt of federal financial
assistance are tied to different "types" of aid. Several of the cases distin-
guish between funding that is direct and that which is indirect.
1. Direct assistance
Identifying the institution or entity which receives direct grants of
federal financial assistance is usually a relatively simple task. The recipi-
127. PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2715 (1986); see also Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 628 F.
Supp. 143, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (federal tax credit for capital improvements does not subject
Con Ed to in-depth regulation).
128. Foss v. City of Chicago, 640 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (1986). The fire department's refusal
to rehire a fireman was not actionable under § 504 because the department was not a recipient
of federal funds under the Federal Death Benefits program, part of the Public Safety Officers'
Benefit Act of 1976, which was directed to employees of fire and police departments and their
dependents, rather than the departments as a whole. The department was also not a recipient
under the Fire Academy program established by the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act
of 1974, directed toward reducing the rate of death, injury and property loss from fires. No
funds actually reached any fire departments as a result of either program, and no fire depart-
ment was free to accept or reject either program. Although both programs benefitted the fire
department, the plaintiff was considered the recipient under the programs and the fire depart-
ment a beneficiary.
129. PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2712 n.ll.
130. "The statute covers those who receive the aid, but does not extend as far as those who
benefit from it." Id. at 2712. The airlines were not the "parties" who had contact with the
government relative to the funds. Thus, they were not in a position to accept or to reject the
federal aid, and they were not in a position to terminate their participation in the federal grant
program and thus avoid the requirements of the civil rights statutes if the requirements became
too onerous. "Under the program specific statutes, Title VI, Title IX and § 504, Congress
enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the recipients of the funds: the
recipient's acceptance of the funds triggers coverage under the nondiscrimination provision."
Id. at 2711.
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ent is the organization which receives the federal benefits and which ex-
pends them for the purpose for which they were authorized.
Most federal funding is classified as "categorical" or "earmarked";
it is targeted to a specific goal.13 1 Congress often makes it explicitly clear
where the funds are intended to go. Recipients are accountable to the
federal funding agency, and subject to audit to assure that the funds are
actually expended for the purpose for which they were granted.
Other funds are classifiid as unrestricted in use, or "non-
earmarked." Examples of unrestricted grant programs are Revenue
Sharing 132 and impact aid to school districts.
133
Although the issue of who or what is a recipient under such pro-
grams is usually straightforward, funds are often channeled through in-
termediaries, such as the states. They are then allocated by the states to
local governments or other entities, which must apply to the state (rather
than to the federal agency) for assistance. The state is considered both a
recipient, 1 3  and a "mere conduit" of funds to the local entity.
1 35
131. As far back as 1964, the U.S. Attorney General prepared a compilation identifying
programs which he believed might be affected by Title VI. 110 CONG. REc. 8359-61 (1964).
At hearings on Title VI, the Secretary of H.E.W. provided a list of department-funded pro-
grams that would bring a recipient within its scope. See Civil Rights Hearings Before Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, 1537-38 (1963).
A few examples of categorical programs are: Education of the Handicapped Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1982) (assisting states and localities to provide free appropriate public
education to all handicapped children); Head Start Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852
(1982) (assistance in improving planning and in conducting educational programs for pre-
school children to provide school readiness skills); Uniform Mass Transit Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1618 (1982) (assistance to local jurisdictions in establishing and maintaining efficient
mass transportation systems).
132. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (1972)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6724 (1982)) (The Revenue Sharing Act).
133. Educational Agencies Financial Aid Act, ch. 1124, tit. I, § 2, 64 Stat. 1100 (1950)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 231-246 (1982)). Impact aid payments to school districts
provide general aid to meet the recipient's general operating expenses. It is granted to local
jurisdictions because of the negative effect of the federal government's presence in the jurisdic-
tion. The funds are intended to compensate the school district for the cost of serving children
whose parents reside or work on federal property, which is not subject to local property taxes.
Impact aid may be used for any purpose, and the funds are usually deposited in the general
fund of the recipient school district. According to one court, impact aid given to a school
district qualifies as federal financial assistance under § 504. Arline v. School Rd., 772 F.2d
759, 763 (1985), aff'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4245 (Mar. 3, 1987). The question of whether impact aid
is federal financial assistance was presented for review in the petition for certiorari filed in
School Board v. Arline, but the Court declined to review this issue. 106 S. Ct. 1633, 1634
(1986).
134. One commentator has suggested that the test to determine a "recipient" is who or
what has the real decision-making authority over the use of federal funds. States supervising
the use of federal funds for their hospitals, institutions, welfare programs and other activities
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2. Indirect assistance
Entities may also receive indirect federal financial assistance. For
recipients, this may open a "can of worms," but for civil rights advocates
the result is far more appetizing. The indirect recipient approach pro-
vides an opportunity for creative lawyering.
As noted, when federally funded programs are administered by state
agencies, the federal funds pass through state control under a federally-
approved state plan to public and private local recipients.136 There is
little doubt that Congress intended these federal funds to be received by
the various service providers. Therefore, hospitals, other health care fa-
cilities, school districts and vocational rehabilitation programs, among
other entities, will be considered indirect "recipients" even if the checks
they receive are issued by state rather than by federal agencies.
A few examples illustrate the breadth of potential coverage based on
indirect assistance. In Graves v. Methodist Youth Services,137 a court
found that a private social service agency was a federal recipient since the
agency was dependent upon federal aid through a state agency. 138 This
was analogous to the receipt of federal funds by Grove City College
through its students. In both cases, federal funds were received "through
another recipient."
' 139
The Medicaid program is another example of indirect federal assist-
ance."4 Federal assistance under Medicaid goes to a state, which con-
tributes funds and administers the program for health care for the poor
are thus responsible for eliminating discrimination. See Parry, The Burger Era Comes to a
Close, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 252, 257 (1986).
135. The students at Grove City College were "mere conduits of the aid to its intended
recipient," the college. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 106
S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (1986).
136. Several examples of such disbursement patterns are the Education of the Handicapped
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982); Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1983) (Medicaid program) and Title XX of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982).
137. 624 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
138. The private agency received 84.3% of its funds through a state agency. The money
received from the state was reimbursement by the federal government under Title XX of the
Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982). It was not the property of the state at the time
of distribution. When the private agency received this funding from the state, the private
agency received indirect federal funding.
139. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1986).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1986). Under Medicare Part A, certain hospitals directly receive
federal funds for treatment of certain aged and disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395d
(1982).
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and disadvantaged.14 1
Those who contract with a recipient may become indirect recipients
of federal financial assistance. Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest
Mississippi,142 concerned a private contractor's respiratory therapy serv-
ices which were integral to the operation of a hospital receiving federal
financial assistance. By virtue of the relationship that linked both par-
ties' revenues to the receipt of Medicare and Medicaid funds, the con-
tractor also received federal financial assistance. The court noted that it
was "not bound, however, to the formalisms of the contractual method
of payment in analyzing the reality of [the contractor's] financial nexus
to [the hospital]." '143
The Court noted that the private company kept weekly tallies of the
number of Medicaid and Medicare patients treated in the department.
Both the hospital and the contractor reaped a percentage benefit of reve-
nues generated by Medicare and Medicaid patients. The Court stated
that:
Unlike the hospital's privately-contracted mower of lawns,
sweeper of floors, or supplier of aspirin, Lifetron [the contrac-
tor] contributes in a direct and tangible way to the hospital's
claims for reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid. That
the federal check does not bear Lifetron's name is no answer to
the fact that the check would not have been written at all were
it not for Lifetron's performance as a de facto subdivision of
Northwest [the hospital].'"
Like Grove City College v. Bell,' where the federal funds were is-
sued to the students rather than directly to the program or activity of the
college
[t]he fact that a respiratory therapist patient's Medicare or
Medicaid payments are remitted first to [the hospital] and then
to Lifetron does not launder those monies: the company is as
much a recipient of the funds as the hospital, which would not
have reaped that portion of its federally funded revenue but for
the provision of services by Lifetron.1
46
The suit in Frazier is unlike the suit in United States Department of
141. United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1044-47, 1049 (5th Cir.
1984) (Medicare/Medicaid payments are federal financial assistance for purposes of § 504).
142. 765 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1985).
143. Frazier, 765 F.2d at 1289.
144. Id. at 1290.
145. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
146. Id.
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Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America," in which the Court's
inquiry was whether the commercial airlines, which compare to the con-
tractor, "received" federal monies. In PVA, the airlines received no aid;
in Frazier, the monies actually received by the contractor were in part
federal financial assistance, i.e., Medicare and Medicaid.
V. "ANY PROGRAM OR AcTIITY"
A. General Discussion
There is a restrictive component to the decision in Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell'48 decision. The Supreme Court did not find that student aid
grants constituted assistance to the entire college. Instead, it held that
the "program or activity" which received federal financial assistance was
merely the student financial aid program. 14 9
After a "recipient" has been identified, the remaining issue is to de-
termine which of its programs or activities receive federal financial assist-
ance."' 0 Two distinct approaches have been adopted by the courts.
B. The Organizational Approach
Some courts have adopted an "organizational" perspective, examin-
ing whether a department or division receives federal financial assistance
in its own name. The obvious fear following Grove City College v. Bell 5'
147. 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986).
148. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
149. See Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 799 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986). Title IX applied
to only the student financial aid program by virtue of its receipt of (BEOG) funds. Any benefit
received by the athletics department was "merely incidental." Id. at 158. In dictum, the court
extended the holding in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), to mandatory student
fees paid in part by federal funds, federal work study money and federal subsidies for physical
facilities. Id.
150. Some courts have had no trouble in finding that a plaintiff in a Title VI action has met
the burden of showing that a program or activity receives federal financial assistance. United
States v. Texas, 628 F. Supp. 304, 321 (E.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd, 793 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1986)
("It is undisputed that Texas receives federal financial assistance for its education programs,
... "). In some cases, defendants have stipulated away the issue. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Green
Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (teaching position at issue was
part of program assisted by Education of All Handicapped Children Act Funds).
Program specificity is not a significant issue when a plaintiff alleges discrimination in
admission to an educational institution. Discrimination in admission practices or standards
pervade an entire educational institution, since a student who is denied admission is ipsofacto
denied access to every program or activity conducted by that institution. See Rice v. President
& Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 339 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.
928 (1982) ("One who is discriminated against in seeking admission is denied access to all
educational programs and activities within an institution, and the entire body of programs
within the school is tainted.").
151. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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was that courts would find the relevant program or activity to be the
smallest organizational unit of the recipient. To an extent, that fear has
become a reality, with some courts looking to the very smallest subunits
of a recipient to determine which is the program or activity at issue. 152
C. The Congressional Intent Approach
A second approach, emphasized by the Supreme Court, is a "con-
gressional intent" scheme, 153 which looks at the congressional goal in
making available particular federal funds.154 The Court in Grove City
College v. Bell115 analyzed the "purpose and effect" of the funding stat-
ute, the statute itself, the statutory language and legislative history of
Title IX and the federal regulations prohibiting discrimination. 15 6 The
Court found that Congress intended BEOG money to supplement the
College's financial aid program, rather than to benefit the institution as a
whole. 157
152. See Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 799 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1986) (financial aid
office rather than athletics department was relevant "program" despite the fact that athletic
scholarships were administered by the student financial aid office); Storey v. Board of Regents,
604 F. Supp. 1200, 1201 n.I (W.D. Wis. 1985) (whether the relevant program was the Depart-
ment of Poultry Sciences as compared to the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences); Mabry
v. State Bd. for Community Colleges, 597 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D. Colo. 1984) (school re-
ceived federal assistance but no funds were specifically designated for or allocated to the physi-
cal education department) (Title IX).
153. A congressional intent approach should not be confused with the "primary purpose"
controversy that plagued civil rights advocates in employment cases under Title IX and § 504.
See supra notes 38-39. First, those cases dealt with a misinterpretation of statutory language,
limiting federal oversight to employment practices where the primary objective of the Federal
financial assistance is to provide employment. 29 U.S.C. § 795(a)(2) (1982); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-3 (1982). Since Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), there is no
such limitation under § 504. The law applies to every "program" which receives federal
money, regardless of the "primary purpose."
Second, there was no liability under the "primary purpose" test unless the plaintiffs them-
selves were beneficiaries of federal funding. Plaintiffs had to show that federal monies were
used for their salaries. But § 504 and Title IX cases apply to "programs." Plaintiffs asserting
claims under § 504 need not be connected with the aspects of the program that receive federal
assistance. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 571 n.21 (1984) (Title IX would
apply to any applicant for student aid, not merely to those who apply for BEOG aid); North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 540 (1982) (Title IX applies to all employees, not
merely to employees whose salaries are paid with federal financial assistance).
154. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 106 S. Ct. 2705,
2711 (1986). The Court looked at the "purpose of the disbursements" and at what "Congress
intended" and what "Congress recognized" in enacting statutes affecting airports. Id.
155. 465 U.S. 555.
156. Presumably, an analysis would also consider the legislative history of the funding stat-
ute and federal agency regulations implementing the funding statute.
157. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573-74. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Bren-
nan agreed that congressional intent in authorizing federal financial assistance is relevant to
the determination of "program or activity." However, he concluded that BEOG monies were
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Courts using this approach have found the "'relevant program or
activity' to encompass all parts-but only those parts-of the entity in
which the monies could have been used."' 58 This does not require a
court to examine where the funds were actually spent, and how they were
actually used. In other words, "it is Congress' intent in authorizing the
aid that controls."'5 9
Congressional intent can be either broad or narrow. In Jacobson v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.,'160 an airline received federal funds to encourage ser-
vice to small communities. The appellate court held that section 504 was
not applicable to the airline company because the federal funds were not
intended to benefit its general passenger service.' 6 ' This holding repre-
sents a narrow interpretation of congressional intent.
Other statutes have been determined to encompass broad policy
goals. For example, in O'Connor v. Peru State College,'62 the appellate
court found that Congress intended Title III of the Higher Education
Act to include improvement of "academic quality."' 6  Therefore, "aca-
demics" was the "program or activity" benefitted by federal funding of
student and faculty research. 64
D. Institution-Wide Coverage
Using either of the approaches discussed above, it is possible to find
that the civil rights statutes reach every activity of an institution. The
intended by Congress to benefit the institution in its entirety. He found it unnecessary to
decide whether Title IX's reach would be the same when more targeted aid was being received
by an institution. "For such cases, it may be appropriate to examine carefully not only the
purposes but also the actual effects of the monies received." Id. at 600 n.13 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 641 (8th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in
original).
159. Id. at 641 n.7.
160. 742 F.2d 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 2129 (1985).
161. See Foss v. City of Chicago, 640 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Although plaintiff's
former employer received some revenue sharing funds, the funds were for training and death
benefit programs that had no connection with plaintiff's employment.
162. 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986).
163. 20 U.S.C. § 1057 (1982).
164. This broad statement of purpose was still not sufficient to reach plaintiff's complaint of
discrimination, which concerned her coaching rather than her teaching duties. O'Connor, 781
F.2d at 642. The court found that "academics" did not include "intercollegiate sports." Id.;
see also United States v. Texas, 628 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd, 793 F.2d 636 (5th
Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs challenged the Pre-Professional Skills Test (PPST) for teachers, which
was alleged to discriminate against minority students enrolled in teacher education courses.
The state contended that no federal funds were used to administer the test. The Court held
that Title VI does apply, because "the PPST is clearly part of the program of teacher education
in Texas, and the teacher program receives federal funds." Id. at 322.
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Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell16 did not reject institution-
wide coverage in general, but only on the facts of that case. 166 In fact,
the Court seemed to contemplate that non-earmarked grants would trig-
ger institution-wide coverage. 167 Typical non-earmarked grants include
impact aid, 161 revenue sharing funds, 169 and block grants.'
70
1. Impact aid
The Eleventh Circuit in Arline v. School Board addressed the ques-
tion whether an entire school system was the recipient of an impact aid
program.' 7' The issue arose when a teacher suffering from tuberculosis
brought suit when she was fired after the school district discovered that
she was in ill health. Although the federal impact aid constituted only a
small portion of the school system's budget,172 it was added to the school
system's general fund, from which teachers' salaries were paid.' 73 Thus,
165. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
166. Id. at 570. See O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 641 n.7 (8th Cir. 1986)
("The Supreme Court did not reject institution-wide coverage in general, but only on the facts
of the case."); see also Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 743 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
167. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573.
168. School Assistance in Federally Affected Areas Act, 20 U.S.C. § 237 (1982).
169. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (1972)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6724 (1982)) (The Revenue Sharing Act).
170. An example of a block grant is Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Im-
provement Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3863 (1982).
Under the Reagan administration, an attempt was made to reduce federal involvement in
state and local affairs. One proposal was to consolidate many categorical programs into "block
grants," under which state and local recipients would have discretion in how to expend federal
dollars, within the general purpose of the block grant. Such grants are provided "without
strings," either unrestricted or for a purpose so general that the recipient is deemed to have
discretion in how to use the funds.
Many of the proposed block grant programs were rejected after forceful opposition from
the public, including many civil rights advocates who feared a reduced commitment to civil
rights enforcement. It is ironic that after Grove City, a block grant approach to federal funding
might have the effect of increasing, rather than reducing, overall compliance with the civil
rights statutes.
171. 772 F.2d 759, 763 (1lth Cir. 1985), aff'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4245 (Mar. 3, 1987). The court
rejected defendant's argument that impact aid was not federal assistance, but was more analo-
gous to land taxes, since it was calculated on the basis of federal ownership of land and served
as a substitute for tax payments the school system would have received if the land had been
privately owned. "ITMhe federal government's exemption from local taxes left it with no legal
obligation to give impact aid. Its choice to assist local entities... renders its assistance no less
a subsidy than any other form of aid that it dispenses." Id. at 762.
172. Defendant received $39,000 in impact aid, approximately 0.3% of the entire school
budget. Id. at 761 n.6.
173. Id. at 761. Compare the court's treatment of non-earmarked impact aid with its analy-
sis of specifically targeted funds. The teacher introduced evidence that the school received
funds under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), now superseded by Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and
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she argued that the recipient of the "program" was the entire school sys-
tem subjecting the school system to regulation under section 504.
The school district responded by arguing that the teacher could not
show that the impact aid funded a program or activity in which she was
employed. Rejecting the school district's theory, the appellate court
reasoned:
Under their [defendants'] theory, it was not sufficient for plain-
tiff to show that the impact funds were non-earmarked monies
which were deposited into the school board's general revenue
fund to be used as it saw fit and that her salary was paid out of
that fund. They argue that she must also show that the impact
monies were actually used to fund her salary, since "the School
Board might have elected to use those funds to pay for a pro-
gram which would have had to be eliminated if the impact
funds had been cut off." This argument strains credulity. Such
a theory would impose on the plaintiff the impossible burden of
tracing money that is virtually untraceable under accounting
procedures which commingle funds in a general account before
outlay are made. It also misconceives the relevant 'program' in
this case.... Once the federal money was deposited into its gen-
eral fund, all activities paid out of that fund became subject to
Section 504.1
Impact aid is received by many school districts, since federally-
owned property is ubiquitous. Even though the amount of impact aid
may be miniscule, it may nevertheless trigger coverage of the entire
school district. Therefore, it is a potentially valuable source of jurisdic-
tion for civil rights plaintiffs. 7 '
Improvement Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3876 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), which provided
monies to schools attended by significant numbers of children from low income families. Ar-
line, 772 F.2d at 761 n.5. Unlike impact aid, these funds were segregated from the general
budget. They were used only to pay the salaries of Title I teachers and to purchase only Title I
program supplies. The plaintiff pointed out that her job entailed significant involvement with
the Title I program in the form of day-to-day conferences with Title I teachers about those of
her students who were involved in the program, but the appeals court did not rule on the issue
in light of its decision on impact aid. Id. at 761. The district court had concluded that Title I
money would not give rise to a cause of action, since the plaintiff was not employed for pur-
poses of Title I or in a Title I program. Id.
174. Arline, 772 F.2d at 763 (emphasis added).
175. See Bradford v. Iron County C-4 School Dist., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1296
(E.D. Mo. 1984). A school district received non-earmarked funds representing federal pay-
ments for students who lived on federal lands and for minerals extracted from mines within the
geographical limits of the school district. The funds were placed within the school district's
general revenues. The court stated that:
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2. Revenue sharing
Until recently, Revenue Sharing funds were an important source of
federal financial assistance for plaintiffs claiming discrimination by local
governments. 176 Unlike a narrowly defined categorical grant program,
Revenue Sharing funds were given to state177 and local governments in
ways that allowed them maximum flexibility in choosing how the funds
would be used, with a minimum of involvement by the federal govern-
ment.1 78 The discretionary aspect of this source of funding meant that
plaintiffs could argue that the federal government's intent in providing
the funds was non-restricted. The local government as a whole, rather
than any subdivision, was the intended beneficiary.
With respect to Revenue Sharing funds, one court found that the
It would be equitable, and in keeping with Congressional intent, to erect a pre-
sumption that every program within an institution that received unrestricted federal
funds is "receiving federal financial assistance." Defendants would be able to rebut
this presumption with proof that these specific unrestricted funds were not spent on
the program or activity in which the plaintiff participated . . . . It is proper that
defendant should bear this burden, because they are in the best position to know
where they spent their general revenues. Any other position would create the anom-
alous result that the more general the federal funding, the less protection handi-
capped individuals would be afforded. This result would be in clear violation of
Congress' intent to provide the most assistance to handicapped individuals that the
expenditure of federal dollars could provide.
Id. at 1299.
176. More than 39,000 local governments received funds under the Revenue Sharing Act.
More than 30,000 of these jurisdictions receive no federal funds except through Revenue Shar-
ing. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF REVENUE SHAR-
ING, FISCAL YEAR 1985. Therefore, the only avenue for claims under § 504 against most local
governments is through Revenue Sharing.
In addition to being a source of federal financial assistance, the Revenue Sharing Act itself
prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap under § 504. 31 U.S.C. § 6716(b)(2) (1982).
Because Revenue Sharing has not been reauthorized, plaintiffs can no longer rely on this
source of funding to trigger civil rights statutes.
177. Until 1980, Revenue Sharing funds were allocated to both state and local governments.
The 1980 reauthorization of the Revenue Sharing Act virtually eliminated payments to state
governments. See State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act Amendment of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
604, 94 Stat. 3517 (1980).
178. Under the original legislation, recipient governments were limited to expending funds
for operation and maintenance in eight "priority" categories including: public safety, trans-
portation, libraries, social services and financial administration. Recipients were required to
hold public hearings and to report on their planned use of Revenue Sharing monies for any
non-capital improvement project. This restriction was removed in the 1976 reauthorization of
the Act and recipient governments were given total flexibility in the use of funds, subject only
to State and local law. See State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendment of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-488, 90 Stat. 2341 (1976). The 1983 reauthorization even eliminated the requirement to
conduct public hearings at which citizens might suggest possible uses for Revenue Sharing
funds. See Local Government Fiscal Assistance Amendment of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-185, 97
Stat. 1309 (1983). Recipient governments do not designate proposed or actual use of Revenue
Sharing funds on their applications.
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local government in its entirety was the recipient program or activity.
The suit in Henning v. Village of Mayfield Village was brought by a vil-
lage police dispatcher under section 504. 9 The plaintiff was employed
by Village of Mayfield as a full-time dispatcher. Originally, dispatchers
worked fixed shifts and Mr. Henning worked the night shift. The village
subsequently converted the fixed shifts into rotating shifts. As a result of
his handicap, the plaintiff complained that he was unable to work rotat-
ing shifts. When the village refused to allow him to work a fixed shift,
the plaintiff filed an action alleging that this refusal constituted discrimi-
nation under section 504.18 He offered evidence that Revenue Sharing
funds were used for payment of engineering fees for the reconstruction
and resurfacing of a road, the implementation of a tool and equipment
rental program for the benefit of village residents, purchase of police ve-
hicles, maintenance of traffic signals and for the purchase of communica-
tions equipment.1 81 The court stated:
[B]ecause the city receives funds to be used as it determines and
does so for so many different purposes, it cannot be found that
the programs or activities receiving funds should be limited to a
small specific use such as to provide employment for dispatch-
ers. Instead the program or activity considered to be receiving
financial assistance for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 must be the Village of Mayfield itself. It is not impor-
tant that in one specific year funds are not used for the police
department. The funds may be allocated there the next year.
A decision that the Village is the program or activity receiving
the financial assistance prevents discrimination against handi-
capped persons from occurring only in the years funds are allo-
cated to the police department.' 2
Compare Henning with another case in which a city chose to focus
its undesignated Revenue Sharing funds on particular programs. In Foss
v. City of Chicago, a fireman brought suit under section 504 alleging dis-
crimination due to his handicap.1 13 The fire department refused to allow
plaintiff Foss to return to work after he suffered a loss of consciousness
on the job as a result of a handicap.
The city received federal Revenue Sharing funds but none of the
funds were allocated to the fire department. However, the fire depart-
179. 610 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
180. Id. at 18.
181. Id. at 19.
182. Id.
183. 640 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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ment did receive federal funds via federal block grants and other specific
programs for job training of low income residents as emergency medical
technicians, training emergency volunteer fire fighters, and for providing
death benefits for firefighters should they be killed in the line of duty.
18 4
The court dismissed the fireman's suit, reasoning that none of the funds
were actually allocated to the city fire department.185 Further, the court
noted that the funds the fire department did receive had no connection to
the plaintiff's employment. 18 6 The Foss court held that "it makes sense"
to limit section 504 to the recipient's actual use of non-earmarked funds.
If Congress or the granting agency intended the funds for a
particular purpose, then the relevant program or activity will in
most cases be the one delineated by Congress in the statute and
its legislative history, or by the agency in its terms for the
grant.... If the funds are not "earmarked," but rather their
use is left to the recipient's discretion, then it makes sense to
define the program or activity not only by the nature of the
federal grant, but also in part by what the recipient did with the
federal money.
87
There is no sound basis for the Foss court's view that actual use
defines "program or activity" with respect to non-earmarked funding.
1 88
This contradicts Grove City, Darrone, and PVA, which all held that the
controlling factor is congressional intent as to permissible uses of the
funds.
The explicit congressional goal in Revenue Sharing was to give au-
tonomy over funding decisions to local governments. The federal gov-
184. Id. at 1089-90.
185. Id. at 1095.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1092 (citations omitted).
188. The court may have confused the § 504 prohibitions against discrimination with the
similar, though not identical prohibition in the Revenue Sharing Act. Although the Revenue
Sharing Act incorporates § 504, it goes on to state that recipient governments charged with
violations have the burden of proving that the program or activity in question is not federally
assisted. 31 U.S.C. § 6716(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Foss seized on this shifting burden
of proof to justify a narrower application of § 504 under Revenue Sharing, based on actual use
of federal funds.
The plaintiff's job is merely to show that a governmental unit receives revenue shar-
ing funds. If so, the court should presume that all of its programs and activities are
federally funded. The governmental unit, however, may rebut that presumption with
clear and convincing evidence that no federal dollars reached the program or activity
in question.
Foss, 640 F. Supp. at 1093. The shifting burden of proof language suggests that a recipient's
actual use of funds may determine which of its activities are subject to non-discrimination
requirements. This quirk in the law is absent from, and inconsistent with, other civil rights
statutes.
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ernment has no interest in the actual use of Revenue Sharing funds. It
does not request information about proposed or actual use in grant appli-
cations or in reporting procedures. Therefore, the "program" receiving
the federal assistance is the local government itself, rather than any of the
myriad of specific activities in which it engages. Even Foss acknowledged
that to hold otherwise is to permit local governments to engage in a
"shell game" of sheltering federal money in discrete programs while dis-
criminating with impunity in the rest of their activities.
189
In practice, few governments will be able to trace their federal dol-
lars after they are deposited into general funds. Therefore, although the
Foss court has suggested that governments may attempt to insulate their
discriminatory activities from federal control, in most cases non-
earmarked funds will reach every activity of a recipient government.
3. Medicare/Medicaid
Institution-wide coverage may also be the case with respect to Medi-
care/Medicaid. Courts have held that participating hospitals are recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance. 190 The program to which the civil
rights apply may be the entire institution, in its provision of medical serv-
ices.' 91 Even the somewhat contrary view that only the inpatient and
emergency room services are "programs" still enhances coverage, partic-
ularly since the handicapped patient need not be a Medicaid or Medicare
recipient to have a cause of action.
192
189. Id. at 1092.
190. NAACP v. Medical Center, 599 F.2d 1247, 1248 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979); Bob Jones Univ.
v. Johnson, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 n.21 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mer., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1975).
191. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit assumed without deciding that neither the United
States nor the hospital was entitled to summary judgment on the issue since many material
facts had not been developed.
For example, the record does not reveal the total amount of federal medicare and
medicaid funds the hospital has received, directly or indirectly, or more importantly,
how those funds are allocated among the various "programs" or "activities" that the
hospital may conduct.
729 F.2d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 1984). The record was devoid of evidence as to how the hospital
was organized, either internally or as a part of a network of state affiliated institutions. The
Supreme Court did not disturb this ruling.
192. See United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1046-47 (5th Cir.
1984), where the court compared the similar program of BEOG benefits at issue in Grove City,
and found no meaningful distinction between federal aid granted directly to an institution, and
federal aid received by an institution by virtue of the participation of eligible individuals in its
program. The court determined that all such benefits are federal financial assistance; the "pro-
gram" receiving them depends on the facts of the case.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The congressional intent approach advocated in this Article consid-
ers the lessons emanating from the Supreme Court decisions in Grove
City College v. Bell, 193 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,194 and United
States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAmerica.'9
Equally important, this approach preserves the overriding goal of the
civil rights statutes: to assure to the maximum reach of federal authority
that tax-supported programs do not engage in discrimination.
The congressional intent approach is not without flaws. Congres-
sional intent, as we have seen, can be either broad or narrow. But such
an approach seeks to eliminate twin evils that might otherwise doom
many civil rights claims.
First, plaintiffs should not be drawn into a controversy over how
recipients actually use their federal financial assistance. 196 This argu-
ment is irrelevant, since the controlling issue is the scope of congressional
intent in providing the funding. Plaintiffs will inevitably be at a disad-
vantage in such an argument. Despite discovery, the information and the
decision-making authority concerning actual use of funds is in the con-
trol of defendants.
Second, recipients cannot be permitted to define "any program or
activity" on their own terms, simply by using an organization name iden-
tified by grant writers. The result would be a "shell game," at least for
non-earmarked funding. Recipients with budgetary procedures solely
within their own control could effectively insulate programs from the
non-discrimination requirements.' 97
One court considered this point "most troubling" but concluded
that Congress had seen fit to give a defendant the "opportunity to struc-
ture its conduct in such a way to avoid being subject to the antidis-
crimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act .... 198 This makes a
mockery of the civil rights laws.
A congressional intent approach places the program specificity issue
in a classic legal framework. Courts and lawyers are accustomed to re-
193. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
194. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
195. 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986).
196. This may be a relevant issue in administrative proceedings commenced by federal
agencies to terminate federal financial assistance to programs or activities of a recipient for
non-compliance with the civil rights statutes. The fund termination procedures are clearly
limited "to the particular program, orpart thereof, in which such noncompliance" is found. 45
C.F.R. § 80.8(c) (1986) (emphasis added).
197. Foss v. City of Chicago, 640 F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
198. Id. at 1096.
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viewing the language of federal statutes and their legislative history. "At
the outset, . . . we look to the terms of the underlying grant statute." 199
Courts also generally defer to executive interpretations as seen through
federal agency regulations implementing a congressional enactment.
If we were writing on a clean slate, the argument would be that
Grove City was inapplicable to section 504. This civil rights statute is
available to "any [handicapped] person aggrieved by any act or failure to
act by any recipient of Federal assistance. ' '2 °° The Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act arguably does no more than what Congress has already accom-
plished in the 1978 Amendments.
Legislation remains the best answer to the present dilemma concern-
ing the definition of "program or activity." Until a legislative cure is
forthcoming, courts will fumble with this issue* Many recent opinions
are characterized by strained analysis of "earmarked" versus "non-
earmarked," actual use versus intended use, and other code words. In
the meantime, although billions of federal dollars are distributed, victims
are uncertain whether they can effectively challenge discriminatory con-
duct. They are forced to go through hoops to establish jurisdiction,
before the merits of their allegations are subject to scrutiny.
To make sense out of the chaos, courts must return to what they
claim to know best: interpreting congressional intent. This is where the
focus should have been all along, and if recipients take advocates off
course, we will have to get back on the right track.
199. PVA, 106 S. Ct. at 2710. Justice Powell has often and aptly stated that "the starting
point of any inquiry into the application of the statute is the language of the statute itself." Id.
His reasoning is particularly significant given the fact that he has authored the majority opin-
ions in so many § 504 cases. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 469 U.S. 1032 (1985);
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). He also authored concurring opinions in Grove City College v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), and Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S.
582 (1983).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
* [Editors Note: On March 19, 1987 and April 1, 1987 various handicapped individuals
and authorities in the field of disability law testified before the United States Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources concerning S.R. 557, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987].
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